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INTRODUCTION
Climate change action is proving to be the political, diplomatic, and
legal rollercoaster of our time. Just as the Paris Agreement got adopted
by almost every single nation in the world and was hailed as the most
promising international environmental law development in years, if not
ever,1 the incoming Trump administration announced its intent to not
* Professor Dellinger is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of South Dakota
School of Law where she teaches Public International Law and International Human
Rights. She researches and writes extensively on the intersection between international
business and environmental law with a particular focus on climate change. Professor
Dellinger is the Editor-in-Chief of the Contracts Prof. Blog, and started and hosts the
Global Energy and Environmental Law Podcast featured on iTunes. She is the Chair of
the International Environmental Law section of the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association. Professor Dellinger is a Fulbright Scholar and peer reviewer for
the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Program. This Article is
dedicated to the late Professor Federico Cheever of the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law—an excellent scholar, teacher, and colleague who treasured our natural environ-
ment and tirelessly sought to protect it.
1 See Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplomatic
Success, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015
/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations [https://perma.cc
/Y5H7-3D5W].
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only withdraw from the treaty, but also to take several other steps to
dismantle much of the climate change progress otherwise made in the
United States.2 The effects of this on the international arena and on the
underlying substantive problem are yet unclear, but it stands to reason
that political, diplomatic, and practical retreat from the superwicked
problem of climate change is not good news on any scale.3
The American stance on climate change stands in stark contrast
with developments in other nations, many of which are already backing
their Paris pledges with national laws.4 One analysis shows that fourteen
new laws and thirty-three executive policies related to climate change
were introduced between the adoption of the Paris Agreement and May
of 2017—a span of just one-and-a-half years.5 These new laws add to the
over 1,200 climate change-related laws that were enacted since 1997 in
no less than 164 countries, including 93 of the top 100 greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emitters.6 Compare this to the fact that in 1997, only sixty such
laws existed just as in 2015 when only ninety-nine nations had any
climate change laws at all.7
Nonetheless, serious doubt exists as to whether we, as a global
society, will be able to curb the problem in time to prevent the potentially
yet unforeseen and highly dangerous consequences of years of excessive
global fossil fuel use.8 Even if the Paris parties actually lived up to their
Paris Agreement pledges, an emissions gap still exists, preventing us
from reaching the 1.5–2° C temperature increase goal stipulated in the
Paris Agreement.9 In other words, if fully implemented, the Paris pledges
2 Cf. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate
-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/AG2X-2AWL].
3 Id.; Myanna Dellinger, An Act of God—Rethinking Contractual Improbability in an Era
of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 67 U.C. HASTINGS L. J. 1551, 1589 (2016).
4 GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE ENV’T, More Countries are Backing
their Paris Pledges with National Laws (May 9, 2017), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamIn
stitute/news/more-countries-are-backing-their-paris-pledges-with-national-laws/ [https://
perma.cc/YV2N-6XVH].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Alister Doyle & Nina Chestney, U.N. Panel to Study a Cap on Global Warming that
May be Out of Reach, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2016); see also Climate Action ‘A Neces-
sity and Opportunity,’ Says UN Chief, Urging World to Rally behind Paris Accord, UN
NEWS CENTRE (May 31, 2017), http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/05
/climate-action-a-necessity-and-an-opportunity-says-un-chief-urging-world-to-rally-be
hind-paris-accord/ [https://perma.cc/XP4D-P8BF].
9 See Kate Wheeling, The World is on Track to Fall Short of Paris Agreement Goals,
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are projected to reduce warming by the end of the century by about half
a degree Celsius only, from 3.6° C to 3.0° C.10
For these and many other reasons, it is doubtful whether regula-
tory and international diplomatic solutions will be forthcoming and suf-
ficiently effective to solve the problem in time. In contrast, litigation may
be an avenue that, in combination with others, might “nudge”11 forth more
action than solely relying on nations and subnational entities to produce
the urgent solutions that we need. Such litigation may take place among
purely private actors, private actors suing government entities, or among
government entities internationally.
A new round of, for the most part, privately instigated climate
change-related litigation commenced in several nations around the
world. This Article will analyze the most promising of these cases in
order to demonstrate the common litigation threads that litigators may
choose to follow in the future. The article will show that these cases are
non-regulatory and non-treaty based. Instead, human rights and consti-
tutional law are appearing as new (or renewed) potential inroads against
both recalcitrant nations and traditionally heavily polluting companies
and industries. Suits for damages under common law torts principles are
also rearing their heads as promising private causes of action. An excep-
tion to the trend away from regulatory-based suits is presented by actions
based on investment regulations such as those in the Securities Exchange
Act as will be briefly described below.
Much litigation risk exists for private entities.12 Litigation, of
course, has several known downsides: It is costly and time-consuming.
Outcomes are far from guaranteed. It is a highly adversarial process that
often leads to hard feelings among parties and bad publicity in the media.
Compliance with judicial decisions is uneven nationally and especially
internationally.13 At the same time,
PACIFIC STANDARD (Nov. 3, 2016), https://psmag.com/news/the-world-is-on-track-to-fall
-short-of-paris-agreement-goals [https://perma.cc/DDX9-76W9].
10 See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2016: A
SYNTHESIS REPORT XVII (2016).
11 See, e.g., Myanna Dellinger, Localizing the Law of Climate Change, 14 MINN. J. L. SCIEN.
& TECH. 603, 652–54 (2013) (for more on the “nudge” theory.).
12 See generally CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION DATABASE, http://climatecasechart.com
[https://perma.cc/Y9PW-NWK9] (listing close to five hundred climate change cases around
the world).
13 See Joseph Sinde Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and Enforcement of Binding
Decisions of International Courts, 5 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS L. 41,
42 (2001).
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[t]hese cases are powerful vehicles for the progressive ac-
tion on climate that is urgently needed. Far from being an
undue interference with policy making processes, courts
are reaching decisions in accordance with existing law and
science. For as long as governments fail to take the steps
necessary to avert dangerous change, courts can be expected
to act as vital checks on political inaction.14
As precious time continues to go by, the climate change problem has to
be tackled from several angles in order to create the solutions that we
simply have to bring about, lest we are willing to enter a future with an
unacceptably high risk of severe and potentially irreversible damage from
climate change. Whereas litigation is not a panacea that can solve the
problem without more, it does present some potential for progress that is
worth investigating in these times of uncertain climate change action at
the political level.
I. THE CASES
A. General Torts
In November 2015, Peruvian farmer Saúl Luciano Lliuya filed
claims for declaratory judgment and damages in a German court against
RWE, Germany’s largest electricity producer.15 Lliuya’s suit alleged that
RWE knowingly contributed to climate change by emitting substantial
volumes of GHGs and that RWE thus bore some responsibility for the
melting of mountain glaciers near Lliuya’s home town of Huaraz.16 That
melting has, in fact, “given rise to an acute threat: Palcacocha, a glacial
lake located above Huaraz, has experienced a substantial volumetric in-
crease of water since 1975 . . . .”17 This rate of increase has accelerated
dramatically since 2003.18 Lliuya sought approximately $19,000 from
RWE towards a local dam in order to protect up to 50,000 people at risk
14 Tessa Khan, How Climate Change Battles are Increasingly Being Fought, and Won, in
Court, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017
/mar/08/how-climate-change-battles-are-increasingly-being-fought-and-won-in-court
[https://perma.cc/JMG2-GCWA].
15 GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENV’T, Lliuya v. RWE
(June 19, 2017), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/lliuya-v-rwe/ [https://
perma.cc/TT4Z-9BGZ].
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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of flooding.19 The amount was determined based on the utility’s historic
contribution to greenhouse gas emissions.20
Lliuya presented several legal theories in support of his claim,
including one that characterized RWE’s emissions as a legal nuisance
and argued that Lliuya had incurred compensable costs to mitigate that.21
Acknowledging that RWE was only one of several contributors to the
emissions responsible for climate change and thus for the lake’s growth,
Lliuya asked the court to order RWE to reimburse him for a portion of
the costs that he and the Huaraz authorities had incurred in order to build
flood protections.22 That portion was 0.47% of the total cost of the project—
the same percentage as Lliuya’s estimate of RWE’s accumulated annual
contributions to global GHG emissions.23
The judge ruled that while there was “scientific causality,” no
“linear causal chain” could be discerned amid the complex components
of the causal relationship between particular GHG emissions and partic-
ular climate change impacts.24 In other words, the court was not con-
vinced that RWE was legally responsible for protecting the town of Huaraz,
despite evidence that RWE’s activities had contributed to the town’s
predicament.25 The court thus dismissed Lliuya’s requests for declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as his request for damages.26 Lliuya’s attor-
ney stated that her client was undeterred and would “most likely appeal”
to a regional court after a thorough review of the case.27 As of this writing,
no such appeal has, however, been filed.28
The importance of the case lies not so much in the court recogniz-
ing the scientifically established link between fossil fuel-based energy
production and climate change, but rather by the court seemingly leaving
the door open to a finding of legal causation between a particular actor
and particular adverse effects of climate change.29 Whereas it is still
19 Megan Darby, Peruvian Climate Lawsuit Against German Coal Giant Dismissed, CLIMATE
HOME (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/12/15/peruvian-climate-law
suit-against-german-coal-giant-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/PMR5-GXRK].
20 Id.
21 GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENV’T, supra note 15.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.; Darby, supra note 19.
25 Darby, supra note 19.
26 GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENV’T, supra note 15.
27 Darby, supra note 19.
28 Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION DATABASE, http://climatecasechart
.com/non-us-case/lliuya-v-rwe-ag/ [https://perma.cc/ZUB7-RYKG].
29 Darby, supra note 19.
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difficult at best or impossible at worst to trace the damaging effects of cli-
mate change to a particular actor,30 especially a corporate one, the “slice
of the pie” theory is becoming more prevalent in climate discourse.31 By
this, scientists have shown that certain percentages of the total problem
can, in fact, be attributed to certain corporations and industries.32 For
example, “nearly two-thirds, 63 percent, of the industrial carbon pollu-
tion released into the atmosphere since 1854 can be directly traced to
carbon extracted from the Earth by just 90 entities.”33 The top twenty
entities (such as Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP, and Shell) produced forty-
eight percent of all industrial carbon pollution, with fifteen percent
produced by another seventy entities.34 Of these ninety companies and
government-run industries, the top eight companies—ranked according
to annual and cumulative emissions below—account for 18.7 percent of
world carbon emissions from fossil fuels and cement production since the
Industrial Revolution.35
This is not a matter of organizations and governance units point-
ing fingers at climate culprits. Companies already undertake a large and
increasing amount of carbon self-reporting.36 For example, an Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) study under-
taken “to better understand current corporate practices and key challenges
in the area of climate change reporting, and to explore companies’ expec-
tations on existing or future government measures in this area . . . .”
showed that “[o]nly 15% of the responding companies do not currently
report climate change-related information.”37 Additionally, “[m]ore than
30 Justin Gillis, How to Slice a Global Carbon Pie?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/science/how-to-slice-a-global-carbon-pie.html [https://perma.cc
/LD69-LECB]; Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1589.
31 Id.
32 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIEN., LARGEST PRODUCERS OF INDUSTRIAL CARBON EMISSIONS
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science
/largest-producers-industrial-carbon-emissions.html#.WUiLF_nyvIU [https://perma.cc
/9RNW-CX8P].
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Douglas Starr, Just 90 companies are to blame for most climate change, this ‘carbon
accountant’ says, SCIENCE (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/08/just
-90-companies-are-blame-most-climate-change-carbon-accountant-says [https://perma
.cc/R5ER-TJ9Y].
36 See CÉLINE KAUFFMANN, C. TÉBAR LESS AND D. TEICHMANN, CORPORATE GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSION REPORTING: A STOCKTAKING OF GOVERNMENT SCHEMES, OECD WORKING
PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/interna
tionalinvestmentagreements/WP-2012_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES65-FTJF].
37 Id. at 12.
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half of the responding companies report climate change related informa-
tion under more than one reporting scheme.”38 Many of the world’s largest
companies willingly disclose their carbon emission and reduction score-
cards.39 One report, for instance, includes self-reporting from more than
5,000 companies across the globe.40 More than four out of five of the largest
public companies of that study now engage with the Carbon Disclosure
Project to allow measurement of their carbon footprints.41 Of course, this
does not show that they are willing to do much about climate change if
it hurts their bottom line. To play devil’s advocate, climate self-reporting
may simply be a matter of playing along with public relations trends
such as “triple bottom line” rhetoric and thus only form over substance.
However, it is still better than no publicity about the issue and may even
work in future legal allocations of liability for climate-caused damages.
Although the Urgenda case analyzed further below is most fa-
mous for its human rights theories, the plaintiffs also argued that by not
regulating and curbing Dutch GHG emissions, the state committed the
tort of negligence against its citizens.42 Although the defendant govern-
ment argued a lack of causation between Dutch emissions and the climate
change consequences against which plaintiff Urgenda sought protection,
the trial court agreed that the Dutch climate policies were inadequate
and unlawful, labeled them as “hazardous negligence,” and ordered the
Dutch government to limit the volume of GHG emissions.43
With increasing focus on and awareness of the exact percentages
of the climate change problem that can be attributed to specific actors,
whether private or government entities, it is becoming more and more
likely that a court may soon find legal causation between a given actor
and specific damage. It is implausible that responsible actors will con-
tinue to be able to avoid liability simply by pointing out that others have
also contributed to the problem. In Lliuya v. RWE, the amount sought
was small, but a finding of legal causation in that or similar cases would
still arguably set important precedent, whether in the legal or simply
38 Id.
39 Ryan Koronowski, Are The World’s Biggest Businesses Addressing ‘The Mother Of All
Risks’?, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 26, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/are-the-worlds-biggest
-businesses-addressing-the-mother-of-all-risks-304c66b257f6 [https://perma.cc/3J2X-KW39].
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 ROGER COX, A CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION PRECEDENT URGENDA FOUNDATION V THE
STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS, CIGI PAPERS (Nov. 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites
/default/files/cigi_paper_79.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6KC-UY6Q].
43 Id.
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everyday sense of the word.44 It may even be more likely that a court would
hold a given actor liable where the damages sought are small rather than
great. In finding defendants liable for relatively small amounts, the par-
ticular defendant would not be unduly harmed, but an important legal
signal would still be sent to others in the same situation to prepare for
potentially larger adverse holdings in the future. Entities around the
world are already preparing for this outcome.45
B. Public and Private Nuisance
With the Trump administration’s climate deregulation efforts, it
is highly likely that the nation will see an increased amount of climate-
related litigation on non-regulatory bases. In addition to the theories al-
ready being trialed, other arguments may be introduced or reintroduced.
For example, whereas public nuisance or negligence suits against power
companies have not been tremendously successful litigation vehicles so far,
new theories and suits are developed on just such bases.46 In September
2017, for example, the cities of San Francisco and Oakland, California,
sued five major oil companies for public nuisance, accusing the oil compa-
nies of organizing massive disinformation campaigns to deceive the
public about the dangers fossil fuel production poses to the planet.47 As
referenced by the San Francisco City Attorney’s News Release,
[t]he lawsuits ask the courts to hold the defendants jointly
and severally liable for creating, contributing to and/or
maintaining a public nuisance, and to create an abatement
fund for each city to be paid for by defendants to fund infra-
structure projects necessary for San Francisco and Oak-
land to adapt to global warming and sea level rise. The total
amount needed for the abatement funds is not known at
this time but is expected to be in the billions of dollars.48
44 See GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENV’T, supra note 15.
45 But see, id.
46 See Michael Burger, The Battle Against Trump’s Assault on Climate Is Moving to the
Courts, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 2, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/stopping-trump-the
-battle-to-thwart-the-assault-on-climate-moves-to-the-courts [https://perma.cc/QR4J-47WW].
47 Complaint at 1–2, People of S.F. v. BP P.L.C., et al., No. CGC-17-561370 (Super. Ct. Cal.,
Sept. 19, 2017); Complaint at 1–2, People of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., et al., No. RG-17875889
(Super. Ct. Cal., Sept. 19, 2017).
48 San Francisco and Oakland sue top five oil companies over costs of climate change, CITY
ATTORNEY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/09/19
/san-franciscooakland-sue-top-five-oil-gas-companies-costs-climate-change/ [https://perma
.cc/GG2M-U2S2].
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And according to Oakland’s City Attorney, “[t]hese companies knew fossil
fuel-driven climate change was real, they knew it was caused by their prod-
ucts and they lied to cover up that knowledge to protect their astronomical
profits. The harm to our cities has commenced and will only get worse.”49
Similarly, San Mateo and Marin Counties as well as the City of
Imperial Beach filed suit against thirty-seven fossil fuel companies for
their role in sea level rise in July 2017.50 The counties’ lawsuit makes
claims of both public nuisance and negligence against the companies.51
Time will tell what happens to these very new lawsuits, but it is
entirely plausible that, with the amounts and clarity of new climate
change science that has emerged in recent years, as well as yet another
round of extremely disastrous weather events in this country and be-
yond, courts will listen with new interest to torts lawsuits in general and,
in particular, allegations of public or private nuisance.
C. Human Rights
One of the most promising and internationally well-known recent
cases is Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands.52 The case
was instituted by the Urgenda Foundation (“Urgenda”), a citizens’ plat-
form that develops plans and measures to prevent climate change.53 The
foundation represented itself and 886 individuals in the case.54 Urgenda
argued that the Dutch GHG emission levels constitute,
an infringement of, or [are] contrary to, Articles 2 [the “right
to life”] and 8 [the “right to health and respect for family
and family life”] of the [European Convention of Human
49 Timothy Cama, San Francisco, Oakland Sue Oil Companies Over Climate Change, THE
HILL (Sept. 20, 2017 3:36 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/351603-san
-francisco-oakland-sue-oil-companies-over-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7ALH-BNHH].
50 See Kevin Kelly, San Mateo County Sues 37 Fossil Fuel Firms Over Sea Level Rise,
MERCURY NEWS (July 17, 2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/17/san-mateo
-county-sues-37-fossil-fuel-firms-over-sea-level-rise/ [https://perma.cc/X7LJ-9AJJ]; see
also Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., et al., No. 17-CIV-03222 (Super.
Ct. Cal. July 17, 2017), https://www.sheredling.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-07
-17-SMCO-Complaint-5bFINAL-ENDORSED5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6DE-J4GA].
51 See Complaint, supra note 47, at 78, 81–82.
52 Rb. Den Haag 24 juni 2015, 2015, 7196 m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/Kingdom of the
Netherlands) at 1 (Neth.), http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-Urgen
davStaat-24.06.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A9S-PMUF].
53 See id at 5.
54 See id.
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Rights] ECHR . . . The greenhouse gas emissions in the
Netherlands additionally contribute to the (imminent)
hazardous climate change. The Dutch emissions that form
part of the global emission levels are excessive, in absolute
terms and even more so per capita. This makes the green-
house gas emissions of the Netherlands unlawful. The fact
that emissions occur on the territory of the State and the
State, as a sovereign power, has the capability to manage,
control and regulate these emissions, means that the State
has “systemic responsibility” for the total greenhouse gas
emission level of the Netherlands and the pertinent policy.
In view of Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, among other
things, the State can be held accountable for this contribu-
tion towards causing dangerous climate change.55
The plaintiffs further argued that
[m]oreover, under national and international law (including
the international-law “no harm” principle, the UN Climate
Change Convention and the [Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union] TFEU) the State has an individual
obligation and responsibility to ensure a reduction of the
emission level of the Netherlands in order to prevent dan-
gerous climate change. This duty of care principally means
that a reduction of 25% to 40%, compared to 1990, should
be realised in the Netherlands by 2020.56
Unsurprisingly, the Dutch government counterargued that no real threat
of unlawful actions towards Urgenda is attributable to the State, that the
State’s actions are in fact aimed at limiting the global temperature rise
to less than 2°C, that the Dutch government has no legal obligation under
either national or international law to take measures to achieve the
reduction targets stated in Urgenda’s claims, and that allowing the claims
to proceed would be contrary to the State’s discretionary power, which in
turn would also interfere with the system of separation of powers and
harm the State’s negotiating position in international politics.57 The
court, however, handed a groundbreaking victory to Urgenda, holding that
55 See id at 29.
56 See id. at 29–30.
57 See Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, at 30.
2018] SEE YOU IN COURT 535
[t]he State must do more to avert the imminent danger
caused by climate change, also in view of its duty of care
to protect and improve the living environment. The State
is responsible for effectively controlling the Dutch emission
levels. Moreover, the costs of the measures ordered by the
court are not unacceptably high. Therefore, the State should
not hide behind the argument that the solution to the
global climate problem does not depend solely on Dutch
efforts. Any reduction of emissions contributes to the pre-
vention of dangerous climate change and as a developed
country the Netherlands should take the lead in this.58
The court also noted that
with this order, the court has not entered the domain of pol-
itics. The court must provide legal protection, also in cases
against the government, while respecting the government’s
scope for policymaking. For these reasons, the court should
exercise restraint and has limited therefore the reduction
order to 25%, the lower limit of the 25%–40% norm.59
However, in reaching its holding, the court noted that “neighboring
countries have adopted targets within the 25–40% range, such as Den-
mark (40 percent) and the United Kingdom (35 percent) [with] . . . no
indication that this hurts their economies and the competitiveness of
their businesses.”60 With this, the court undoubtedly sent a signal that
the Dutch government ought to aim higher rather than lower in its ef-
forts to curb GHG emissions.
The 2015 Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations
argue that there are sufficient legal means by which both countries and
large fossil fuel companies can be compelled to limit GHG emissions.61
They conclude that judges can draw on international law, human rights,
and international environmental law to order states to enact better cli-
mate policies and thus prevent the harmful effects of climate change.62
58 See id. at 1.
59 See id.
60 COX, supra note 42.
61 See Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations 3 Mar. 1, 2015, http://global
justice.macmillan.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/OsloPrinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XYZ2-B6VX].
62 See id. at 2.
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The Urgenda case is one of the first major court-directed steps in that
direction. The Dutch government has, however, appealed the case.63 No
verdict has yet been issued in the appeal.64
The case is very promising, not only because of the potential for indi-
viduals and public interest NGOs to gain standing to argue government
responsibility for insufficient climate change action, but also for the poten-
tial that courts may cross otherwise strictly drawn prudential and consti-
tutional lines between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches
of government in affirmatively ordering national governments to adopt
stricter climate change mitigation laws. Although the ruling would not
be binding on any other nation than Holland, it would still be a ground-
breaking legal development in times when national governments still
seem to waver on what action to take against climate change. It might set
precedent for the world that would, hopefully, be repeated many times
in other nations. “It always seems impossible until it’s done,” Nelson
Mandela once said.65 “Once it’s done, it becomes easier to do it again, to
replicate it.”66 The significance of Urgenda, unless overruled by an appel-
late court, is its potential to set precedent in relation to torts, human
rights, international environmental law, and, equally if not more impor-
tantly, the ability of private entities to gain standing to argue legislative
shortcomings in relation to climate change.
In Belgium, the public-interest NGO Klimaatzaak similarly sued
the federal and regional governments of Belgium in April 2015 for con-
tributing to global climate change by failing to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.67 Klimaatzaak has sought to force the Belgian government to
reduce GHG emissions 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 87.5% below
1990 levels by 2050.68 Similarly to the Urgenda lawsuit, the Plaintiffs in
Klimaatzaak have, among other things, alleged that failure to reduce
63 See Despite Pressure from Parliament, the Dutch Government Refuses to Pull Appeal
in Landmark Climate Case, URGENDA 1 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://us1.campaign-archive2
.com/?u=91ffff7bfd16e26db7bee63af&id=c5967d141c&e=46588a629e [https://perma.cc
/5YM7-T5XN].
64 See id at 2.
65 Jessica Durando, 15 of Nelson Mandela’s Best Quotes, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2013/12/05/nelson-mandela-quotes
/3775255/ [https://perma.cc/3SBP-JF97].
66 COX, supra note 42, at 13.
67 VZW Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium and Others, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
DATABASE 1 (2017), http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/non-us
-case/vzw-klimaatzaak-v-kingdom-of-belgium-et-al/ [https://perma.cc/3TCN-2XM8] (no
case documents are yet available).
68 See id.
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emissions constitutes a violation of human rights laws.69 No further de-
cision has yet been issued,70 but these two cases could signal an important
shift in judicial views on insufficient governmental climate change regula-
tions, at least in the European Union (“EU”). Whether these cases could
also be influential beyond the EU remains to be seen. Currently, many
United States courts—including and most notably the Supreme Court—
are reluctant to ascribe much weight to non-American law.71 Any European
development in this area may thus not have much effect in the United
States. Conversely, as both climate change science and law develop on
their own accord around the world, American judges would be remiss in
turning a completely blind eye to international legal developments in this
area. Some judges are, in fact, showing an increasing willingness to render
opinions that favor climate plaintiffs in previously unforeseen ways,72 as
will be analyzed next.
D. Constitutional Rights and General Governance Principles
As a precursor of legal developments to come, a Nigerian federal
court held as early as in 2005 that gas flaring is unconstitutional, as it
violates the guaranteed fundamental rights of life and dignity of human
persons provided in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.73 A number of re-
cent noteworthy cases around the world have further supported the rights
of individuals to a healthy environment under both national, constitu-
tional, and general governance principles.
For example, in South Africa’s first climate change lawsuit,74 the
High Court found that South Africa is not only a significant contributor
to global GHG emissions as a result of the significance of mining and
minerals processing to the South African economy and its coal-intensive
69 Id. In a similar vein, the Columbia Constitutional Court recently struck down laws that
threatened high-altitude ecosystems, calling these “carbon capture systems.” See Corte
Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], febrero 8, 2016, C-035/16 (Colom.).
70 See id.
71 See Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348,
353 (2002).
72 For an example of this, see Am. Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410
(2011).
73 See Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd., (2005) AHRLR 151 (Nigeria).
74 Victory in SA’s first climate change court case!, CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://cer.org.za/news/victory-in-sas-first-climate-change-court-case [https://
perma.cc/7NDT-D9E5].
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energy system, but also particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change due to the nation’s socio-economic and environmental context.75
The court held that the South African government should thus have
given proper consideration to the climate change impacts of a proposed
coal-fired power station before a decision was made to allow for the power
station to be built.76
In Pakistan, a farmer filed suit alleging that the Pakistani govern-
ment’s inaction and delay in implementing its National Climate Change
Policy and addressing vulnerabilities associated with climate change
violates the fundamental constitutional rights to life and dignity.77 In its
first order, the Lahore High Court declared that
climate change is a defining challenge of our time and has
led to dramatic alterations in our planet’s climate system.
For Pakistan, these climatic variations have primarily re-
sulted in heavy floods and droughts, raising serious concerns
regarding water and food security. On a legal and consti-
tutional plane this is [a] clarion call for the protection of
[the] fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, in par-
ticular, the vulnerable and weak segments of the society
who are unable to approach this Court.78
The court invoked the right to life and the right to dignity protected by
the Constitution of Pakistan and international principles, including inter-
generational equity and the precautionary principle.79 Finding that federal
and provincial officials had taken little, if any, on-the-ground action to
implement adaptation measures to cope with changing climatic patterns
that threaten food, water, and energy security, the court directed responsi-
ble ministries and departments to appoint a focal person on climate
change to appear before the court, and to prepare a list of adaption mea-
sures to be completed by the end of 2015.80 The court also established a
Climate Change Commission to help the court monitor progress and
75 See Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v. The Minister of Envt’l. Affairs, (2016) The High
Court of South Africa Gauteng Division, Pretoria 65662 at 25 (S. Afr.).
76 See id.
77 See Asghar Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) Lahore High Court Green Bench, W.P.
25501 (Pak.).
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 See id.
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achieve compliance with guidelines.81 Interestingly, the court noted that
although “Pakistan’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is
very small, its role as a responsible member of the global community in
combating climate change has been highlighted by giving due importance
to mitigation efforts in [other] sectors.”82
In a second order, the court further recognized that “[f]or Paki-
stan, climate change is no longer a distant threat—we are already feeling
and experiencing its impacts across the country and the region. The
country experienced devastating floods during the last three years. These
changes come with far reaching consequences and real economic costs.”83
For that reason, the court explained, it is important to implement the
recommendations in Pakistan’s National Climate Change Policy in order
to “ensure that climate change is mainstreamed in economically and so-
cially vulnerable sectors of the economy and to steer Pakistan towards
climate resilient development.”84 The court further listed each official
appointed as a “focal person” on climate change and the members of the
Climate Change Commission.85 The court retained jurisdiction (in the
form of a continuing mandamus) to hear reports from representatives
concerning their future progress.86
In these and other newer cases, it is refreshing to see the focus on
the environment over traditional “economic development first” argu-
ments, especially in developing nations. Accepting, for a moment, the
argument that action against climate change can be economically costly
in the short term, it stands to reason that wealthier nations can better
afford such action than developing nations. However, even highly devel-
oped nations often still do not focus on environmentally sound develop-
ment, or indeed the lack of development, for environmental reasons.
An Austrian court also broke ground with this trend in 2017 when
it blocked construction of a new runway at Vienna’s airport mainly on
the grounds that the project would increase climate-changing GHG in
violation of the Austrian Constitution and the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Paris Agreement.87
81 See id.
82 See Asghar Leghari v. Fed’n. of Pakistan (2015), LHC (Second Order) (Sept. 14, 2015)
(Pak.).
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 Bob Berwyn, Climate Change Concerns Prompt Court to Block Vienna Airport Expansion,
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The Austrian Climate Protection Law—which forms part of the Austrian
Constitution—requires that the transportation sector reduce its share of
the total GHG emissions by 2.25%.88 However, construction of the run-
way would have increased emissions by 1.79%.89 Under Austrian law,
federal administrative law courts must decide cases involving state or
federal permits such as this one by weighing competing public interests,
including both the economy and the environment.90 Said the court:
“Through construction of the third runway and the increased air traffic,
CO2 emissions in Austria would see a distinct increase. In the court’s
view, the additional CO2 emissions can’t be justified, even though the
proposal has positive economic aspects.”91 Furthermore, “[i]ncreased
particulate air pollution and the loss of productive agricultural lands
were also cited as considerations in the ruling.”92 This case was the first
climate change case in Austria, although there have been other cases in
Austria where projects have been blocked for environmental reasons.93
A similar lawsuit is underway in Norway.94 Notably, “activists in
that case are asking a court to block a government permit for offshore oil
drilling, basing their arguments on new climate protection provisions in
the Norwegian Constitution that guarantee a healthy environment for
citizens.”95
In arguably the most famous non-regulatory environmental case
in the United States in recent years, world-renowned climate scientist Dr.
James Hansen and a group of youth, acting as guardian for future genera-
tions, filed suit against the federal government, claiming that the govern-
ment’s affirmative actions in causing climate change have violated the
youngest generation’s constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property,
just as the government has failed to protect essential natural resources
in violation of the public trust doctrine.96 The government and, unsurpris-
ingly, the intervenors (the National Association of Manufacturers, the
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, Feb. 15, 2017, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/14022017/cli
mate-change-vienna-airport-paris-climate-agreement-james-hansen [https://perma.cc
/9WU3-BK32].
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Id.
92 Berwyn, supra note 87.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016).
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American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, and the American Petro-
leum Institute) moved to dismiss for, inter alia, failure to state a claim.97
Recognizing that “[t]his is no ordinary lawsuit,” and exercising her “rea-
soned judgment” as required by this particular area of the law, the judge
noted that she has “no doubt that the right to a climate system capable
of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society”
and that “a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”98
Before denying the motions to dismiss, the judge further stated that
this lawsuit may be groundbreaking, but that fact does not
alter the legal standards governing the motions to dismiss.
Indeed, the seriousness of plaintiffs’ allegations underscores
how vitally important it is for this Court to apply those
standards carefully and correctly. Federal courts too often
have been cautious and overly deferential in the arena of
environmental law, and the world has suffered for it.99
In June 2017, the same judge also denied the Trump administra-
tion’s motions seeking an interlocutory appeal of her 2016 opinion and
order denying the U.S. government and fossil fuel industry’s motions to
dismiss.100 Demonstrating the Trump administration’s intense objections
to this case, the government immediately filed a rare writ of mandamus
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking, again, to avoid an actual
trial on the merits.101
Whether framing the issue as a general public trust issue or citing
to particular constitutional and other human rights provisions, it is clear
that plaintiffs are finding their way into new legal arenas rather than re-
lying on traditional regulatory ones. This makes sense as few lasting posi-
tive results have stemmed from regulation action—including lawsuits—in
recent years, at least in the United States.102 New litigation venues simply
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1250.
99 Id. at 1262.
100 See Juliana, et al. v. United States et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, WL
2483705, at *2 (D. Or. June 8, 2017).
101 Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Oregon, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
102 See, e.g., Tim Doyle, Congress Must Come to Terms On Climate Change Regulation, THE
HILL (Oct. 29, 2017, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/357701-con
gress-must-come-to-terms-on-regulating-climate-change [https://perma.cc/R3UB-27FD].
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have to be sought out as precious time is, amazingly, still lost to unneces-
sary and counterproductive discussions about what to do about climate
change at the governance level. Human and constitutional rights present
just such promising, albeit relatively uncharted, possibilities for litiga-
tion that may well assist in pressing the climate issue forward in times
of much government stalling and even denial.
E. Fraud and Investments
Much money is at stake for companies that, for years, have invested
in products and services that have since proved to be turning unviable
in the long term for climate change reasons. This is particularly true for
energy providers.103 But so is it for investors in various companies who
stand to lose very large amounts of money if their investments do not
pan out. Thus, “ExxonMobil (“Exxon”) shareholders have filed a class-
action lawsuit against the company alleging that it misled its investors
and the general public by failing to disclose the risks posed to its business
by climate change.”104 The alleged deception resulted in stockholders paying
inflated prices for Exxon stock and subjected them to financial losses
because the company knew that the value of its oil reserves was less than
what it was telling investors.105 Plaintiffs claim that
Exxon has long understood the negative effects of climate
change and global warning and their relation to the world-
wide use of hydrocarbons . . . Exxon understood and ap-
preciated that it was highly likely that it would not be able
to extract all of its hydrocarbon reserves and that certain of
those assets were “stranded.” Yet Exxon publicly repre-
sented that none of its assets were “stranded” because the
impacts of climate change, if any, were uncertain and far
off in the future.106
This would be a violation of the Securities Exchange Act as well as a breach
of Exxon’s fiduciary duty to its investors.107 The Securities and Exchange
103 David Hasemyer, Class-Action Lawsuit Adds to ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Woes, IN-
SIDE CLIMATE NEWS, Nov. 21, 2016, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18112016/exxon-cli
mate-change-research-oil-reserves-stranded-assets-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3J8V-YD5E].
104 Id.
105 Compl. at 22–23, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:16-CV-3111 (N. D. Tex. Nov. 7,
2016).
106 Id. at 7.
107 Id. at 23.
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Commission (“SEC”) is currently investigating the allegations.108 This
lawsuit adds to the legal woes of Exxon as the company also faces fraud
investigations by the attorneys general of New York and Massachusetts
under the states’ consumer protection laws.109 The attorneys general are
seeking to determine whether Exxon deceived consumers and investors
about the role of its products in contributing to climate change.110 A lawsuit
by ExxonMobil seeking to block these climate change fraud investiga-
tions was dismissed in April 2017.111
Additionally, a group of current and former employees are suing
ExxonMobil under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”).112 The employees claim that the company has endangered the
value of their retirement accounts by fraudulently inflating its stock and
misrepresenting what it knows about the risks of climate change to its
business.113 They allege that executives in charge of the employee retire-
ment plan knew the company was committing fraud in misrepresenting
the dangers of climate change and thus should have avoided investing in
its stock.114 They argue this was most irresponsible when the stock was
at its most-inflated price and that the company should have written off
its stranded assets when the stock price was low and had less distance
to fall.115 In failing to do so, the employees claim the company abdicated
its fiduciary responsibility.116 It is important to note that Exxon and
other companies had already known since the early 1970s that the fossil
fuel they produce causes global warming.117 For example, “Exxon con-
ducted cutting-edge climate research decades ago and then, without re-
vealing all that it had learned, worked at the forefront of climate denial,
manufacturing doubt about the scientific consensus that its own scientists
had confirmed.”118
108 Id. at 20.
109 Hasemyer, supra note 103.
110 Id.
111 Order at 1, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, No. 17-CV-2301 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,
2017).
112 Am. Class Action Compl. at 2, Attia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:16-CV-03484 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 2, 2017).
113 Id. at 15.
114 Id. at 12–13, 40, 42.
115 Id. at 50–51.
116 Id.
117 Marcelo Gleiser, ExxonMobil Vs. The World, NPR (Nov. 30, 2016 5:13 AM), http://npr
.org/sections/13.7/2016/11/30/503825417/exxonmobil-vs-the-world [https://perma.cc/RGE5
-BMWM].
118 Neela Banerjee et al., Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, Sept. 16,
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Perhaps motivated by these developments, Chevron has become
the first major oil company to warn investors of risks from climate change
lawsuits to corporate profits and thus to investments in such companies.119
In the “risk factors” section of Chevron’s 2016 10-K financial performance
report to the SEC, Chevron clearly admits that “increasing attention to
climate change risks has resulted in an increased possibility of govern-
mental investigations and, potentially, private litigation against the com-
pany.”120 This may seem obvious, but recall that this is “Big Oil,” the
industry that denied the existence of climate change for over half a cen-
tury while at the same time knowing full well of not only the reality of
climate change itself, but also its dangers to our planet.121
These developments follow in the wake of the much-publicized
“dieselgate scandal” in which Volkswagen (“VW”) agreed to a $4.3 billion
settlement—“the largest ever U.S. criminal fine levied on an automaker
to settle charges that it conspired for nearly 10 years to cheat on diesel
emission tests.”122 The company also agreed to pay $153.8 million to
California.123 In total, VW has agreed to spend approximately $22 billion
to address claims from owners, environmental regulators, U.S. states,
and dealers just as six current and former senior VW executives have
been indicted criminally for their roles in the scheme.124
Sadly, it has become fairly common knowledge that even major,
reputable companies have gone to extreme lengths to continue protecting
their profits, even to the extent that major frauds have been committed
2015, https://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken [https://perma
.cc/6KPJ-D2JG].
119 Joe Romm, Chevron is first oil major to warn investors of risks from climate change
lawsuits, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 2, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/chevron-ad
mits-climate-lawsuits-threaten-profits-33937dd562fd [https://perma.cc/DWB8-N7LW].
120 Ian Johnston, Chevron warns it could face climate change lawsuits with future oil drilling
potentially ‘economically infeasible,’ INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3, 2017, 5:17 PM), http://www
.independent.co.uk/environment/chevron-oil-warn-climate-change-lawsuits-drilling-green
house-emissions-economically-infeasible-a7609411.html [https://perma.cc/43F9-NAYF].
121 Joe Romm, 50 Years Ago Big Oil Bragged About Being Able To Melt Glaciers, While
They Knew About Climate Change, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2016 6:57 PM), https://
thinkprogress.org/50-years-ago-big-oil-bragged-about-being-able-to-melt-glaciers-while
-they-knew-about-climate-change-728efe887daa [https://perma.cc/9YX3-AKKY]; see also
Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1551, 1570.
122 David Shepardson, U.S. indicts six as Volkswagen agrees to $4.3 billion diesel settle-
ment, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2017 9:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen
-emissions-epa-idUSKBN14V1T0 [https://perma.cc/32W6-WADD].
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on the general public and individual investors alike.125 Regulations have
not prevented this. Frankly, litigation may not either, given the near-
desperation under which some industries appear to operate in order to
continue their corporate activities. In particular, this is the case for “Big
Coal” and “Big Oil.” But, given the fact that regulations and common busi-
ness ethics have been violated to such an extent, litigation certainly seems
to be a viable method of asserting significant pressure on some of the com-
panies and industries who otherwise resist the development in this area.
II. FURTHER POSSIBLE LITIGATION
A. National Scale Litigation
Regulatory, including, in particular, environmental impact state-
ment lawsuits are always promising or threatening, depending on one’s
viewpoint, in the climate change context. For example, “a coalition of en-
vironmental groups, ranchers, and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe have
filed a lawsuit challenging the Department of Interior’s decision to lift the
moratorium on leasing coal on federal lands without having completed
a promised environmental review.”126 Further,
New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is
leading a coalition suing the Trump administration for de-
laying efficiency standards for a host of appliances, includ-
ing air conditioners and commercial boilers. In yet another
lawsuit, environmental, consumer, and labor groups are
challenging a Trump executive order on reducing regula-
tions and regulatory costs, saying the order violates the
separation of powers and will strip away safeguards that
are vital to protecting the environment and public health.127
In the insurance context, insurers have already sent the signal to
their clients that they better prepare for climate change or risk getting
sued. For example, in 2014, Farmers Insurance Group (“Farmers”) filed
nine class-action lawsuits against two hundred municipalities and small
towns for failing to prepare for floods and storms that will cost insurance
125 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:16-CV-3111; Am. Class Action Compl.,
supra note 112; Shepardson, supra note 122.
126 Burger, supra note 46, at 360.
127 Id.
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companies billions of dollars in payments unless sufficient remedial efforts
are undertaken.128 Although Farmers subsequently dropped the lawsuit,129
it remains clear that similar lawsuits may well be filed in the future.
Cities and municipalities may be held liable for negligence if they, for
example, decide to ignore the vulnerabilities exposed by a changing climate.
Even nation states may not be safe from lawsuits for liability for loss and
damage caused by climate change, despite their attempts in the Paris
Agreement to avoid such liability.130 For example, the century-old princi-
ple that a nation may not allow its territory to be used in ways that cause
harm to the territories of other nations has been expanded to include the
global commons.131 “ ‘States are under an obligation to protect the envi-
ronment of other states and in areas beyond national jurisdiction from
damage caused by activities on their territory.’ This notion is not limited
to neighboring states.”132 Of course, lawsuits for such liability would
involve difficult issues of causation and excuse, but with the legal devel-
opments that we currently witness in this area, it is likely that courts
would precisely find legal traceability between activities that cause cli-
mate change and at least major wrongdoers such as those in the fossil
fuel industry and governments who have failed to take sufficient regula-
tory action against climate change for decades. Similarly, traditional ex-
cuses such as force majeure and necessity may well no longer be granted to
defendants in this field.133
Lawsuits will pose a particular problem for private companies that
lack the legal protections that otherwise “provide government agencies im-
munity from liability for discretionary decisions such as delaying infra-
structure upgrades due to budget constraints.”134 For instance, “[o]ne could
easily imagine architects and engineers being accused of professional
malpractice for designing structures that don’t withstand foreseeable
climate-related events,” says Michael Gerrard of the Sabin Center for
128 Insurer’s Message: Prepare for Climate Change or Get Sued, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2014,
4:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/insurers-message-prepare-cli
mate-change-or-get-sued-n122856 [https://perma.cc/H3UU-74UK].
129 Id.
130 See generally Myanna Dellinger, Rethinking Climate Change-Related Force Majeure
in Int’l Law, 37 PACE L. REV. 455, 476 (2017).
131 See, e.g., id. at 455, 476.
132 Id. at 476 (citing to ‘No-Harm Rule’ and Climate Change, LEGAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE
at 2 (July 24, 2012), http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BP42E
-Briefing-Paper-No-Harm-Rule-and-Climate-Change-24-July-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc
/92CW-HFH5]).
133 See generally Dellinger, supra note 15; Dellinger, supra note 130.
134 Insurer’s Message: Prepare for Climate Change or Get Sued, supra note 128.
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Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.135 The exact nature of the
legal risks in this area may not be known, but it is becoming clear that
the risk of at least having to defend oneself against lawsuits on climate
change bases is increasing whether defendants are small or large compa-
nies, government units, or even federal governments. The latter will be
briefly examined next.
B. International Scale Adjudication
International-level adjudications among nation states, or obtaining
advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice, provides another
set of options for potential progress against climate change in combination
with diplomatic negotiation solutions and national-level legislation.136
Adjudication may be seen as a departure from the approach of the
UN climate change regime, which is, to a great extent, based on negotia-
tions and broad agreement.137 The regime has generally adopted a mana-
gerial rather than an enforcement approach to compliance.138 Concepts
such as “reporting,” “review,” or “compliance” have been met with great re-
sistance, whereas less confrontational terms such as “communication of
information,” “international consultation and analysis,” and “multilateral
consultative processes” have been preferred.139 The “rule of negotiations
paradigm”140 has been favored as it is considered to bring about a greater
degree of legitimacy than national or even international adjudication.141
However, the UNFCCC regime does operate with adjudication as
an explicit option for dispute settlement dependent on state consent.142
Adjudication may serve a valuable complementary role to international
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 130, at 459–60, 476–77.
137 UN Launches Partnership Initiative to Promote South-South Cooperation on Climate
Change, UN SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.un.org/sustainable
development/blog/2016/04/the-united-nations-launches-new-partnership-initiative-to
-promote-south-south-cooperation-on-climate-change [https://perma.cc/2ZEC-D2QD].
138 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
139 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 12–13, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Copenhagen Accord to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC Decision-/CMP.5, para. 5, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/L.9.
140 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 493–95 (1993).
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agreements and national-level legislation. For example, whereas demo-
cratic theory calls for people of a community to be able to govern them-
selves, democratic theory does not say that legislators are entitled to make
decisions that affect people in other countries who are not represented in
a given electoral process and thus have no voice.143 Litigation could address
specific contested issues at the national, but also international level.
However, even when international agreements are reached and
allow for adjudication—such as the UNFCCC framework—the issue of
climate injustice is often not addressed sufficiently from the point of view
of vulnerable nation states. For example, such states were not even able
to establish a mechanism to consider the issue of loss and damage until
the 2013 Warsaw Agreement.144 The 2015 Paris Agreement, however,
makes it difficult for nation states to argue liability for damages caused
by certain nations because the relevant article “does not involve or provide
a basis for any liability or compensation.”145 Still, under the UNFCCC
regime, litigation is at least possible due to the state consent given under
the framework.146 Of course, actual litigation outcomes are far less certain
and come with the usual range of litigation downsides.
Another less contested option may be to seek an advisory option
from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).147 An ICJ opinion would
arise outside the will of negotiation parties and thus not be subject to
endless negotiations and possible renegotiations.148 An ICJ opinion re-
garding the obligations of states to ensure that their GHG do not cause
serious damage to other states could potentially assist the negotiating
process. Importantly, the ICJ has already declared that the duty to
prevent significant transboundary harm is part of general international
law.149 The conflict between this holding and the UNFCCC framework’s
143 STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
89–90 (2008); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 337–38 (2d Ed. 1996).
144 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate
Change Impacts, UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.19, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, at 6
(Jan. 31, 2014).
145 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21, para. 51, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2016).
146 UNFCCC, supra note 139, art. 14.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See CHINTHAKA MENDIS, SOVEREIGNTY VS. TRANS-BOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL HARM:
THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS AND THE SETHUSAMUDURAM SHIP
CHANNEL PROJECT, UNITED NATIONS/NIPPON FOUNDATION FELLOW PAPER 7–8 (2006),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers
/mendis_0607_sri_lanka.pdf [https://perma.cc/24ES-3VUS]; see also Legality of the Use
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rejection of liability for loss and damage appears obvious. The ICJ could
delineate the responsibilities and liabilities in this context.
More diffuse advantages of an ICJ opinion are that it could help
shape and influence future national and international negotiations on
climate change. Negotiations often focus on what nation states are ex-
pected to do from practical and political angles. An ICJ opinion would
help focus attention on the resulting legal obligations and outright
financial liabilities that the world community will have to grapple with
very soon. An opinion could, in other words, influence the ongoing UN
climate negotiations, by “setting the terms of debate, providing evalu-
ative standards . . . and establishing a framework of principles within
which negotiations may take place to develop more specific norms.”150
Judicial decisions serve to “redistribute argumentative burdens,”151 not
only in future litigation, as precedents, but also in international diplomacy.
Finally, an ICJ opinion could serve an expressive function and
thus help change social norms and values in general.152 Of all things
needed, this is currently among the more important, as social paradigm
and value shifts could, finally, provide a platform for the drastic change
needed in relation to climate change.
As with everything, downsides of international adjudication also ex-
ist. Defendants may not comply, so even contentious proceedings may not
actually prove effective in resolving disputes and bringing about the change
needed. Actual litigation—and thus not “just” an advisory opinion—is
contentious and may produce long-term effects of ill will, bad publicity,
and further withdrawal from the international legal and diplomatic scene
than what we are already witnessing. Such negative effects may spill
over into future climate negotiations. However, the vicissitudes of na-
tional and international climate policy have made action at other levels
of governance, by both public and private actors, more important than
ever. This includes litigation-based approaches.
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CONCLUSION
Along with other action, litigation may well prove to be an impor-
tant method of ensuring the much-needed progress against climate change.
Solely relying on regulatory action and government goodwill, it unfortu-
nately appears, will not ensure a timely solution to the problem. Litigation
proved successful in many other contexts (think tobacco, asbestos, faulty
vehicles, and many medical treatments), and so too may it in relation to
climate change. Lawsuits may set important legal precedent in legal sys-
tems that recognize this, but even where precedent is not legally recog-
nized, they will undoubtedly make a major impression on judges and
others. Says Michael Gerrard: “I think the great impact is that these de-
cisions may embolden some judges around the world to use similar theories
when deciding climate cases. It’s always easier to be fifth or tenth at
something than first.”153
Some experts even consider legal action to be the “last, best hope
for averting catastrophic climate change.”154 Says former NASA scientist
and climate activist James Hansen:
[t]his . . . is the conclusion I’ve come to. I’ve gone to more
than a dozen countries, and to my surprise, it’s not much
different than the U.S. The fossil fuel industry is incredi-
bly powerful worldwide. They have the ability to influence
the executive and legislative branches of governments in
all countries, so we have to plan on using the judicial branch
to take action.155
As litigation may, on the one hand, seem hostile and counterproductive,
it may well prove to be an effective and certainly much needed way of
signaling to lawmakers around the world that, as has been said so many
times already, action can no longer wait. This is particularly true in the
United States with our lingering and now apparently resurfacing resis-
tance towards what we know we have to do: phase out our excessive use
of fossil fuels and chemicals that place our planetary climate system in
153 Bob Berwyn, Climate Change Concerns Prompt Court to Block Vienna Airport Expan-
sion, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, Feb. 15, 2017, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/140 22017
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extreme jeopardy.156 It appears that we as a nation keep beating around
the bush for reasons of politics and corporate profits. Whereas there is a
time and place for everything including shifting political attitudes and, of
course, corporate profit-making, we simply have to realize that turning a
blind eye to the necessity of taking effective action against climate change,
undesirable as this may be for some actors, will only be making things
much worse in the now no longer so distant future. To the extent that cor-
porations, governments, and other responsible actors do not take suffi-
cient action against climate change, one of the adverse consequences they
will have to face will be lawsuits with worse and worse chances of winning.
156 Gleiser, supra note 117.

